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INTRODUCTION 
+11547 
Rather than address select aspects of neuroscience, or particular problems 
with which I happen to have been involved, or to personally reminisce about 
golden "days that are no more," I plan to respond to the kind invitation 
to write a prefatory chapter for this volume with a few observations bearing 
on matters that, while personal in some respects, are also of general ongoing 
concern to all of us in science and particularly to the future of neuroscience 
as a discipline. 
We used to'say that there are two kinds of scientists: those fired-up by 
a problem and searching for methods to get the answers, and those highly 
trained in some method who are searching about for some amenable prob­
lems. While most of us line up somewhere between these extremes, there 
is much to be said for, at least in principle, giving preference where possible 
to problem priorities over methodology. What follows is, above all, prob­
lem-oriented and attuned throughout to the query, "What difference does 
it make?-especially ten, twenty, or more years from now?" 
In terms of governmental funding and in other respects, it has become 
apparent that the overall federal rating for neuroscience is not as high today 
as it was prior to the Nixon budget reforms of the early 1970s. Nor does 
it appear that the decline is something temporary from which funding can 
be expected soon to recover. Nor is it restricted to neuroscience; science in 
general has been affected with certain exceptions such as cancer-related, 
energy-related, and other select projects where a major application to cur­
rent quality-of-life problems is obvious. These changes in relative funding 
can be assumed to reflect real changes in social priorities and in society's 
IPreparation of the manuscript was aided by the F. P. Hixon Fund of the California Institute 
of Technology. 
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2 SPERRY 
collective judgment of the importance of science and what it contributes. 
We read in Science (Sawhill 1979) of the "public disillusionment" and 
"today's more jaundiced view" of science and that "faith in the beneficence 
of scientific endeavor and the promise of technology has been steadily 
eroding." 
An underlying cause for these changes can be seen in the new and 
growing recognition of mounting global, so-called "crisis" problems which 
science is alleged to have helped to create and which in addition are compli­
cated by social value problems for which science is apparently unable to 
provide answers. When the quality and even survival of civilized society is 
potentially in threat, what difference does it make to Congress or the public 
whether we find some new nerve connections in the brain, some new trans­
mitters or receptors, and so on? Even the ever-strong humanitarian appeal 
of medical advancements that might eventually save hundreds of thousands 
of lives does not fully escape the new unspoken perspective of a world 
already afBicted with population imbalances in the hundreds of millions. 
The overwhelming priority of the growing demands of today's "global 
crisis" problems was already perceived in the late 1960s (Platt 1969) to be 
of sufficient magnitude and urgency to warrant mustering the scientific 
community in an all-out crash attack with the implication that to continue 
the practice of "science as usual" is morally indefensible. 
Although little has happened in the interim to reduce the specter of 
global breakdowns, it seems that considerable has happened to discourage 
public feeling that science and improved technology can be counted on to 
bring solutions. While the world's production per capita of most major 
products of the basic biological source systems has already peaked and 
started on a long downward trend (Brown 1979), world demand continues 
to rise at the rate of 6 million people per month with predictions of inevita­
ble social turmoil as peoples and nations grow more desperate. 
Earlier hopes that science might rise to the occasion with "green revolu­
tions" and other technological answers begin to fade. Science and improved 
technology, we come to realize, merely make it possible to better maintain 
more people in better style, for a While, until new limits are reached and 
the same problems reappear, along with new ones, and all on a greatly 
magnified scale. Science and advanced technology, whether medical, agri­
cultural, military, energy-related, etc, are now seen, in the long run, to put 
us in an escalating vicious spiral of technology-population-energy-pollu­
tion-etc increases, in which we are now firmly entrapped. There is no 
reflection here on science or technology per se, of course. As we say, Utopia 
is tomorrow's level of technology combined with the population levels of 
the nineteenth century. Remedial suggestions, however, that might in any 
way involve the highly sensitive, value-laden factor of population controls 
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 3 
promptly raise a host of moral issues and value conflicts for which, again, 
science, it is held, does not provide answers. 
Futurists and common logic concur that a substantial change, worldwide, 
in lifestyle and moral guidelines will soon become an absolute necessity. On 
a planet of finite resources, the laws and mores of a freely increasing 
population must eventually be replaced by those of a regulated population, 
and the sooner this inevitable shift occurs, the better for the residual quality 
of the biosphere. In brief, it becomes increasingly evident that the prime, 
urgent need of our times is not for more science and improved technology, 
medical or otherwise, but for some new ethical policies and moral guidelines 
to live and govern by. 
Once this conclusion is perceived, the common tendency is to by-pass 
science to look elsewhere for answers. Problems that resolve to basic issues 
in ethics and morality are traditionally supposed to be beyond science. It 
is argued that science which describes facts cannot be used to prescribe 
values. Prevailing doctrine in modern philosophy asserts that it is logically 
impossible to derive values from a set of scientific facts, or to infer what 
ought to be from what is. In view of the collective effect of various consider­
ations of this kind, it is hardly surprising that public faith in the promise 
of science and technology "has been steadily eroding." 
A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
In what follows I try to defend a position directly counter to the above, 
which would, in effect, not only restore to science any loss in public favor, 
but would go further to give science, and the scientific endeavor generally, 
a new public image and a higher societal role of top priority. On the 
proposed terms, science becomes the prime hope for escape from the vicious 
spirals of advancing civilization, but for other reasons. A different approach 
to the public support and role of science is suggested in which science is 
upheld, not because it begets improved technology, but because of its un­
matched potential for the shaping of ethical values. In the worldvie,' per­
spectives and truths of science we will find the best key to valid moral 
guidelines. The arguments are adapted to today's priorities and grow 
stronger, not weaker, as current global conditions worsen. Even basic 
"pure" research and the practice of "science as usual" emerge on the 
proposed terms with a heightened social and moral approval. 
The usual appeal to medical, educational, technological, and other direct 
benefits is by-passed and our bets are placed instead on certain less obvious 
human value implications that stem from brain research. Particularly rele­
vant are recent changes in concepts relating to the mind of man, the nature 
of the conscious self, freedom of choice, causal determinacy, and to the 
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4 SPERRY 
fundamental relation of mind to matter and to brain mechanism. Some of 
man's most enduring concerns are involved, i.e. whether consciousness is 
mortal or immortal, cosmic or brain-bound, or reincarnate, and the like. It 
is in terms of the humanistic implications along these and related lines that 
neuroscience has always had its special interest and greatest meaning. 
Ideologies, philosophies, religious doctrines, world-models, value systems, 
and the like will stand or fall depending on the kinds of answers that brain 
research eventually reveals. It all comes together in the brain. 
In brief, recent conceptual developments in the mind-brain sciences are 
seen to bring changes in worldview perspectives that revise the ultimate 
criteria and frame of reference for determining human value priorities and 
resolving value differences. A broad shift of conceptual framework regard­
ing science and human values is involved. Promising prospects can be seen, 
especially as these changed perspectives apply in those global crisis areas 
wherein lie today's most serious threats to the quality of life, and where 
differential outcomes in the resolution of value conflicts tend to have tre­
mendous social consequences. For example, even a slight shift in the deli­
cate balance of value perspectives on the abortion vs right-to-life issue could 
mean the difference, in itself, of literally many millions of lives, pro or con, 
in the next few years-with enormous secondary impacts as well-and all 
compounded on future generations. Similar wide-ranging, quality-of-life 
consequences result from a shift of values in regard to energy-environmen­
talist issues, species' rights, and other global concerns. 
It is our present contention that a scientific approach to both the theory 
and the prescription of ethical values is not only feasible, but is by far the 
best way to go, offering the most promising, perhaps only, visible hope for 
future generations. The supporting arguments have already been ex­
pounded in some detail elsewhere and may be found in the original articles 
cited and their references (Sperry 1965, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980). Rather 
than assume prior knowledge or laboriously restate the reasoning in differ­
ent words, it is more expedient for present purposes to simply list below 
some of the principal postulates, propositions, observations, and inferences 
as excerpted with minor changes from the previous accounts. Because the 
subject matter ranges somewhat afield from neuroscience, overlap and re­
dundancy are risked rather than the reverse. Some attempt at logical order­
ing is maintained, but the cross logistics mount rapidly, and a quick grasp 
of the whole may be found preferable to a logical sequential approach. 
COLLECTIVE POSTULATES AND PROPOSITIONS 
Subjective Values in Objective Perspective 
oIn addition to their commonly recognized significance from a personal, 
religious, or philosophic standpoint, human values can also be viewed objec-
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. N
eu
ro
sc
i. 
19
81
.4
:1
-1
6.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.an
nu
al
re
vi
ew
s.o
rg
 
A
cc
es
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 In
sti
tu
te
 o
f T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
on
 0
1/
15
/2
0.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
CHANGING PRIORITIES 5 
tively in causal control terms as universal determinants in all human deci­
sion-making. All decisions boil down to a choice among alternatives of what 
is most valued, and ate determined by the particular value system that 
prevails . 
• Human values, viewed in objective, scientific perspective, stand out as 
the most strategically powerfuL causal control force now shaping world 
events. More than any other causal system with which science now concerns 
itself, it is variables in human value systems that will determine the future . 
• Any given brain will respond differently to the same input and will tend 
to process the same information into quite diverse behavioral channels 
depending on its particular system of value priorities. In short, what an 
individual or a society values, determines very largely what it does. 
·As a social problem, human values can be rated above the more tangible 
global concerns such as those of poverty, pollution, energy, and overpopula­
tion on the ground that these more concrete problems are all man-made and 
are very largely products of human values. Further, they are not correctable 
on any long-term basis without effecting adaptive changes in the underlying 
human values involved . 
• 
The human value factor in biospheric controls stands out as the primary 
underlying root cause of most of today's difficulties. The more strategic way 
to remedy mounting adverse global conditions is to go after the social value 
priorities directly in advance, rather than waiting for man's values to change 
in response to changing external conditions. Otherwise we are doomed to 
live always on the margins of intolerability, for it is not until things begin 
to get intolerable that the voting majority gets around to changing its 
established values . 
• Recent developments in the mind-brain sciences eliminate the tradi­
tional dichotomy between science and values and support a revised philoso­
phy in which modem science becomes the most effective and reliable means 
available for determining valid criteria for moral value and meaning. 
Value Theory 
.A science of values in the context of decision theory becomes conceivable 
extending into all branches of behavioral science and forming a skeletal core 
for the social sciences . 
• The seemingly endless complexity of human values is greatly simplified 
by viewing values in hierarchic structures which are goal dependent, and 
further, by restricting attention to those areas that are involved in social 
conflict . 
• The innate components of the value structure, which include inherent 
psychological as well as biological values, can be treated largely as a com­
mon invariant denominator of human nature, allowing the focus of atten-
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6 SPERRY 
tion to be directed to problems of the acquired, cognitive, ideological values 
where the major sources of value conflict arise . 
• On analysis, values are found to be correlates of directed activity. They 
are always relative to some purpose, goal, or aim, explicit or implicit, and 
structured in goal-dependent hierarchies. Any concept or belief regarding 
the purpose and value of life as a whole, once accepted, then logically 
supersedes and conditions the entire hierarchy of value priorities at subsid­
iary levels. Values at the ideological plane become ordered and ethical issues 
judged in accordance with the conceived ultimate purpose of life as a whole. 
This latter will logically imply at the same time an associated worldview or 
universe scheme that is consistent . 
• Because of the hierarchic structure of values the search for improved 
ethical guidelines can be narrowed to the search for what ought to be most 
valued. This in tum leads to problems of the highest determinants of value 
priorities-the "life goal," "world model" concepts and beliefs that lie at 
the heart of the problem of moral judgment and logically condition the 
value structure at all levels. 
·Societal values, especially of the kind people disagree on, are always 
dependent upon, and relative to, some general frame of reference containing 
the premises, beliefs, presuppositions, etc on which the reasoning about 
priorities rests. The question may be raised "What makes one reference 
frame superior or supersedent to another?" and then, "Is there some ulti­
mate frame of reference for values that could logically and rightly be 
accepted and respected by all countries, cultures, governments, and creeds, 
and by mankind in general, as the final supreme standard when it comes 
to judging ethical priorities, resolving value conflicts, and as a guideline for 
human judgment generally and international decision-making in particu­
lar?" The practical need for some such unifying global standard becomes 
more and more evident for things such as world population control, con­
serving world resources, protecting the oceans and atmosphere, and for 
various other modem world problems that increasingly require united effort 
on a global scale . 
• What is needed ideally to make decisions involving value judgments is 
a consensus on some supreme comprehension and interpretation of the 
universe and the place and role within it of man and the life experience. 
Dependence on Mind-Brain Concepts 
.Beliefs concerning the ultimate purpose and meaning of life and the 
accompanying world view perspectives that mold beliefs of right and wrong 
are critically dependent, directly Of by implication, on concepts regarding 
the conscious self and the mind-brain relation and the kinds of life goals and 
cosmic views which these allow. Directly and indirectly social values de­
pend, for example, on whether consciousness is believed to be mortal, 
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 7 
immortal, reincarnate, or cosmic and whether consciousness is conceived 
to be localized and brain-bound or essentially universal, etc . 
• Recent developments in mind-brain theory revise the ultimate criteria 
and our ultimate frame of reference for determining value priorities. Prob­
lems of values, ethics, and morality (questions, i.e., of what is good, right, 
and ethically true and of what ought to be) become, in these revised terms, 
something to' which science, in the most profound sense, can contribute 
fundamentally and in which science should be actively and responsibly 
involved . 
• Current concepts of the mind-brain relation involve a direct break with 
the long-established materialist and behaviorist doctrine that has dominated 
neuroscience for many decades. Instead of renouncing or ignoring con­
sciousness, the new interpretation gives full recognition to the primacy of 
inner conscious awareness as a causal reality. 
-The phenomena of conscious experience are conceived to play an active, 
directive role in shaping the flow pattern of cerebral excitation. Instead of 
being parallelistic and acausal, consciousness in the present scheme 
becomes an integral part of the brain process itself and an essential and 
potent constituent of the action. Consciousness is put to work and given a 
use and a reason for having been evolved in a physical system. Subjective 
phenomena including values are brought into the causal sequence in human 
decision-making and behavior generally and thus back into the realm of 
experimental science from which they had long been excluded . 
• The seemingly irreconcilable dichotomies and paradoxes that formerly 
prevailed with respect to mind vs matter, determinism vs free will, and 
objective fact vs SUbjective value become reconciled today in a single com­
prehensive and unifying view of mind, brain, and man in nature . 
• The swing in psychology and neuroscience away from materialism, re­
ductionism, and mechanistic determinism toward a new, monist, mentalist 
paradigm restores to the scientific image of human nature the dignity, 
freedom, responsibility, and other humanistic attributes of which it has long 
been deprived in the materialist-behaviorist approach . 
• A nonreductive holistic world model and interpretation of physical real­
ity is supported in which the qualitative pattern properties of all entities are 
conceived to be just as real and causally potent as those of their components. 
This preservation of the qualitative value and pluralistic richness of physical 
reality stands counter to the common tendency to correlate science with 
reductionism. 
Toward the Prescription of Values 
·Instead of separating science from values, the current interpretation 
leads to a stand in which science becomes the best source, method, and 
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8 SPERRY 
authority for determining the ultimate criteria of moral value and those 
ultimate ethical axioms and guideline beliefs to live and govern by . 
• The classic fact-value and is-ought dichotomies of philosophy logically 
dissolve in the context of cerebral processing. The operations of the brain 
are already by nature richly replete with established values and value deter­
minants, both inherent and acquired, with the result that incoming facts 
regularly interact with and shape values. The resultant value system, along 
with conceptions of what ought to be, is determined in very large part by 
the factual input. 
.Changing to an ethic based in science would entail in large part a 
substitution of the natural cosmos of science for the different mythological, 
intuitive, mystical, or "other-worldly" frames of reference by which man 
has variously tried to live and find meaning. The aim is not to eliminate 
value controversy and differences of opinion but only to bring these into a 
domain set by an agreed-upon frame of reference supported by science­
not with the idea that scientific truth is absolute or beyond question, but 
only with a conviction that it does represent the best and most reliable, 
credible, and dependable approach to truth available . 
• Once science modifies its traditional materialist-behaviorist stance and 
begins to accept in theory and to encompass in principle within its causal 
domain the whole world of inner, conscious, subjective experience (the 
world of the humanities), then the very nature of science itself is changed. 
The change is not in the basic methodology or procedures, of course, but 
in the scope and content of science and in its limitations, in its relation to 
the humanities and in its role as a cultural, intellectual, and moral force. 
The kinds of interpretations that science supports, the world picture and 
attendant value perspectives and priorities, and the concepts of physical 
reality that derive from science all undergo substantial revisions on these 
new terms. The change is away from the mechanistic, deterministic, and 
reductionistic doctrines of pre-1965 science to the more humanistic inter­
pretations of the 1970s. Our current views are more mentalistic, holistic, 
and subjectivist. They give more freedom in that they reducethe restrictions 
of mechanistic determinism, and they are more rich in value and meaning . 
• Accepting as self-evident the ultimate value of what man generally has 
held most sacred, namely, the cosmic forces that made, move, and control 
the universe and created man, and interpreting these in accordance with 
science, one emerges with a value system that includes a strong reverence 
for nature promoting the values of the recycle philosophy, population regu­
lation, protecting and enhancing environmental quality, and the like . 
• In the eyes of science, to put it simply, man's creator becomes the vast 
interwoven fabric of all evolving nature, a tremendously complex concept 
that includes all the immutable and emergent forces of cosmic causation 
that control everything from high-energy subnuclear particles to galaxies, 
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 9 
not forgetting the causal properties that govern brain function and behavior 
at individual and social levels. For all of these, science has gradually become 
our accepted authority, offering a cosmic scheme that renders most others 
simplistic by comparison and which grows and evolves as science advances . 
• Science becomes man's best channel for gaining an intimate under­
standing of and rapport with those forces that control the universe and 
created man. This is not to suggest that science take on the functions of 
religion; but only that there might be mutual and other benefits from a 
fusion of the two . 
• The future of science will be very different depending on whether science 
is recognized in the public mind to have competence in the realm of values. 
Reciprocally the future of society also will be very different depending on 
whether its value perspectives are shaped from science and the worldview 
of science or by other alternatives that now prevail. 
THE KEY TO QUALITY SURVIVAL 
Implicit in the foregoing is the conclusion that our top social priority today 
is to effect a change worldwide in man's sense of value. This translates by 
hierarchic value theory into a change in what is held most sacred. What is 
needed, more specifically, is a new ethic, ideology, or theology that will 
make it sacrilegious to deplete natural resources, to pollute the environ­
ment, to overpopulate, to erase or degrade other species, or to otherwise 
destroy or defile the evolving quality of the biosphere. This is exactly what 
is found to emerge from our current approach to the theory and prescription 
of human values. Relying on the kind of truth supported by science we 
arrive at an ethic that promotes an ultimate respect for nature and its 
creative principles, including those of its peak thrust into the highest 
reaches of man's mind, along with corollary value criteria which, if applied 
worldwide, would promptly set in motion the kinds of corrective legislation 
and other trends and pressures that are needed to remedy looming global 
disaster conditions. 
On the terms proposed the utility of science takes a different form. Society 
would look to science not only for new technology and objective knowledge 
but, more importantly, for the criteria of ultimate value and meaning. Each 
advance of science brings increased comprehension and appreciation of the 
nature, meaning, and wonder of the creative forces that move the cosmos 
and produced man. Even "science as usual" gains, in this context, a height­
ened social significance and moral support. The special, key role of neuro­
science and brain research will be readily apparent. 
It remains to further stress a point already implied, namely, that for 
science to fully qualify and function effectively in this changed role, it will 
be necessary that we abandon an entire mode of scientific thinking long 
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10 SPERRY 
referred to under the general rubric of "scientific materialism." Moves to 
abide by the truths of science, as opposed to unproven claims from other 
sources, have had sporadic support since Francis Bacon. What is new today 
is the shift in science from reductive physicalism to a holist-mentalist para­
digm and the changed interpretations and perspectives that this brings. 
Among traditional views that consequently require correction is that predi­
cating the impotence of science in regard to value judgments along with 
much of the doctrine associated with reductive mechanistic determinism 
that for many decades has characterized science and our scientific outlook. 
This was the thinking of Karl Marx and is the reason that the more 
materialistic and animalistic aspects of human nature are put first in Soviet 
philosophy before man's more idealistic, more spiritual components. The 
issues at stake are not minor. They involve not only the public image of 
science, the relation of science to human values, and the kinds of values 
science upholds, but also some of our more basic concepts in science con­
cerning physical reality, mind and matter, and the nature of causation. 
CAUSAL DETERMINISM: THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
The issues narrow to opposed views of causation that are basic and central 
to everything stated thus far. One view holds that the causal forces and laws 
operating in nature are fully explainable in purely physical terms and are, 
in principle, ultimately accountable on the basis of quantum theory, the 
elemental forces of physics, or in some more unifying field theory eventually 
to be found. Physicalist, i.e. materialist, determinism is assumed to prevail 
throughout nature in this view and all higher level interactions, including 
those of the brain, are presumed to be reducible and accountable, in princi­
ple, in terms of the ultimate fundamental forces of physics. 
Opposed to this long dominant physicalist-behaviorist interpretation is 
the view which we here uphold and which has recently been gaining in­
creased acceptance particularly in the behavioral sciences. It contends that 
the higher forces and laws of causation, as seen for example in classical 
mechanics, in physiology, and in brain function and behavior, cannot be 
fully explained by the laws of quantum mechanics or by the mechanics or 
laws of any other ultimate physical force or field. The higher entities and 
their causal properties and laws of interaction are conceived to be causal 
realities in their own right and not determined completely (though they are 
in part) by the causal laws and properties of their components. The larger, 
higher, more molar properties are perceived to be just as real, just as causal, 
and in many ways to be of more importance than are the more basic physical 
properties of their subsidiary components. In this view the fundamental 
forces of physics are only building blocks used in creating bigger, more 
competent entities and forces. The patterning of the building components, 
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 11 
i.e. their arrangement in space and time, becomes a distinctive key factor 
in making things what they are, and is not determined solely by the proper­
ties of the parts themselves. 
To attempt to explain an entity in terms of its parts and then the parts 
in terms of their parts and so on, results in an infinite regress in which one 
is left at the end trying to explain everything in terms of next-to-nothing. 
At each step of the way critical pattern components of causality are lost and 
the explanation becomes less and less complete at each lower level. To 
attempt to include, even in principle, the pattern factors, i.e. the space-time 
components, by invoking the "interactions of the parts," the "organiza­
tional relations," etc at each step, sounds good but is an empty lip service. 
We have no science for the space-time components, no science of the 
organizational relations and interactions. Particularly we have no science 
for the collective form in which these are present at each level of the 
infrastructure. Even the relatively ultra-simple interactions involved in the 
classic "three-bodies problem" are too much. 
Our present view holds further that when a new entity is created the new 
properties of the entity, or system as a whole, thereafter overpower the 
causal forces of the component entities at all the successively lower levels 
in the multi-nested hierarchies of the new infrastructure. In other words 
whenever an entity jOins forces with others to form a new whole, the 
position that it is forced to take in the universe and its subsequent course 
through time and space and its eventual fate are thereafter determined more 
conspicuously by the new properties of the system as a whole than by its 
own original properties. A degree of self-determinacy is lost to the parts as 
soon as the higher powers of the new whole become superimposed. Al­
though the causal forces at the lower quantal, atomic, molecular, etc levels 
in the infrastructure continue to operate in full force as usual they are 
enveloped, encompassed, overwhelmed, superseded, supervened, and out­
classed by the new causal properties that emerge in the whole. Evolution, 
in the course of compounding new compounds continuously adds new 
entities and new phenomena that embody new qualities, new causal forces, 
and principles with new scientific laws and control properties. 
The new emergent phenomena, not reducible, in principle, to their parts 
and deserving to be recognized as causal realitie� in their own right, are in 
many respects more powerful and dominant features of reality than are the 
lower properties of the components. Instead of a universe completely con­
trolled by quantum mechanics and the basic forces of physics, science 
presents, by this interpretation, a universe controlled by a rich profusion of 
qualitatively diverse emergent powers that become increasingly complex 
and competent. Any randomness, chance, caprice, or chaos that may be 
operating at the quantum level, as modern physics insists, gains little expres­
sion because it is effectively superseded and controlled by higher level forces 
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12 SPERRY 
that are anything but random. The higher levels involve much more than 
mass probabilities. The creative, interlocking web of evolving nature is not 
blind or chance-like but becomes, as it progresses, rich in irreversible, 
directional, ever more complex constraints that tend to keep things moving 
in a trend toward higher and more competent forms. 
In the brain, controls at the physico-chemical and physiological levels are 
superseded by new forms of causal control that emerge at the level of 
conscious mental processing, where causal properties include the contents 
of subjective experience. Causal control is thus shifted in brain dynamics 
from levels of pure physical, physiological, or material determinancy to 
levels of mental, cognitive, conscious, or sUbjective determinacy. The Bow 
of nerve impulse traffic and related physiological events in a conscious 
process is no longer regulated solely by events in kind but becomes caught 
up in, enveloped, and moved by the higher mental controls, somewhat as 
the Bow of electrons in a television set is moved and differentially patterned 
by the program content on different channels. Just as the programming 
variables of a TV monitor have to be included in order to account for the 
electron Bow pattern of the system, so also in the brain the subjective, 
mental variables of cerebral function have to be included to give a full 
account of the Bow patterns of neural excitation. The mental events of 
conscious experience and the physico-chemical events of the infrastructure 
are not conceived to be in a parallelistic relation like that of "two lan­
guages," "two logics," or of "two complementary aspects of one and the 
same situation" in which a "purely physical determinacy of the CNS" is 
preserved as MacKay (1980) and others would have it. This shift from a 
causal determinacy that is purely physical to one that includes conscious 
subjective forces that supersede the physical-in other words the shift from 
a materialist, reductionist, mechanistic paradigm to a holistic, mentalist 
paradigm-makes all the difference when it comes to using the "truths" of 
science as criteria of ethical values. 
MARXISM INVER TED 
In trying to assess possible social repercussions and the outcome of a 
societal shift to an ethic founded in science, it would be unfortunate and 
misleading if one were to rely on Marxism and the Communist World as 
an example. According to our latest mind-brain theory and its implications, 
Marxist-Communist doctrine is founded on some basic errors in the inter­
pretation of science and of what science stands for and implies in reference 
to human nature and to social and world view perspectives. As a result, the 
kinds of values upheld in Marxist doctrine are almost the diametric opposite 
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 13 
, from those which emerge from a scientific approach on our present terms. 
If the growing competition between Communist and Free World coun­
tries is to continue to be in part a battle for men's minds, it may be worth 
a few words in closing to point out some of the ideologic value differences 
that result even though the intent in both cases is to exclude dualist "other­
worldly" criteria in favor of the truths of science. Some of the basic starting 
differences include the following: 
1. First and foremost, Marx accepted the long established-but now largely 
overthrown-view that science, of necessity, leads to and supports a 
materialist philosophy that rejects subjective mental phenomena as 
causal and predicates instead a purely materialistic determinancy for the 
CNS. 
2. The doctrine of reductionism was accepted as applied to nature in gen­
eral and human nature in particular. 
3. Also intimately related to the above, Marx failed to recognize the key 
principle of "downward causation," i.e. the causal control that higher 
properties in any entity, whether a society or a molecule, invariably 
impose over the lower properties of their infrastructure. 
4. Marxism, further, lacks any theory that serves to resolve the is-ought 
fallacy or the traditional dichotomy that has heretofore kept science and 
human values separate. 
5. Marxism also lacks the "free-will" concepts we have today that free 
individual and social decision-making from mechanistic determinism. 
6. Marx opted for a throughly homocentric value system that makes man 
the measure of all things and gives precedence to the basic material needs 
of man over the quality of the biosphere, as well as over man's higher 
psychological needs. There is no justification in science for this latter 
choice and it is, in some respects, an inversion of nature that puts the 
welfare of a part of a system above that of the system as a whole. 
Basically, according to Marx, what counts in human affairs and changes 
the world are man's actions in fulfilling his material needs for subsistence, 
not man's idealisms, philosophy, or ideology. He emphasized that the mate­
rialistic-animalistic needs must come first and that the higher human pur­
suits are built upon and depend on the more basic components. On the other 
hand, Marx failed to appreciate that the higher idealistic properties in man 
and society, once evolved, can then supersede, encompass, control, and take 
care of the lower material needs; that this is the way of evolving nature and 
when it comes to rules for progress, works better than the inverse. One of 
the best refutations of Marxism is Marxism itself in that it was not Marx's 
actions in satisfying his material needs for subsistence that changed the 
world, but his philosophy, visionary ideas, and Communist ideology. 
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. N
eu
ro
sc
i. 
19
81
.4
:1
-1
6.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.an
nu
al
re
vi
ew
s.o
rg
 
A
cc
es
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 In
sti
tu
te
 o
f T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
on
 0
1/
15
/2
0.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
14 SPERRY 
A value system that puts its ultimate good in the welfare of the "Party," 
and at the same time pointedly scorns reverence for nature, does little to 
help remedy most of our mounting global crisis conditions which today are 
the overriding concern. There is nothing in Marxist doctrine to help control 
overpopulation, curb pollution, conserve resources, preserve the environ­
ment, protect endangered species, etc. Nature in Marxist materialism is not 
something to be revered but almost the reverse, i.e. something to be battled 
and subjugated, transformed, mechanized, and exploited to satisfy man's 
(mainly material) needs. The forces of nature as interpreted by Marx in the 
materialist tradition are blind and unprincipled (Bell 1975), not something 
rich in quality, wonder, and beauty, harmoniously controlled with countless 
checks and balances, and full of creative strategies, constraints, and princi­
ples that have been time-tested for success in creating, preserving, and 
improving the quality of the biosphere, including man. 
In Marxism not nature but technology and production power are idol­
ized. Cathedrals for Marx are factories and skyscrapers, and the beautiful 
dream is to transform whole continents by industrial progress with "huge 
new populations springing up as if by magic" (Ryanzanoff 1963). The 
narrow focus on class conflict in an industrialized society also does nothing 
for the major ailments of the planet today and again is expressed in terms 
of the mechanistic determinism of the more material and elemental needs 
and components in man's makeup at the expense of the higher psychologi­
cal needs and more idealistic components. The causal power of cognitive 
ideals that behavioral science recognizes today, was, on principle, dis­
missed. Where nothing is sacred and there is no higher meaning (beyond 
that of the "Party"), everything loses meaning. In its homocentric emphasis 
on the more material needs and aims of man, technology, industry, and 
production power, combined with its demeaning view of nature, Marxism, 
in direct contrast to the views we reach above, seems to represent almost 
the epitome of the worst forces that have caught up with us today to 
produce most of the adverse crisis conditions that threaten the future. The 
basic relevance of brain research to all these issues can hardly be overem­
phasized. 
IN SUMMARY 
In the context of today's mounting global problems the relative demand for 
medical, educational, and related social benefits that derive from the neuro­
sciences is diminished. At the same time the human value spin-offs of brain 
research are thrust into a strategic position of top concern because of their 
key role as criteria for policy priorities and decision-making guidelines. 
Recent conceptual developments in the mind-brain sciences rejecting reduc-
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CHANGING PRIORITIES 15 
tionism and mechanistic determinism on the one side, and dualisms on the 
other, clear the way for a rational approach to the theory and prescription 
of values and to a natural fusion of science and religion. Science can be 
upheld as the best route to an increased understanding and rapport with the 
forces that made and move the universe and created man. The outlines of 
a value-belief system emerge that include an ultimate respect for nature and 
the evolving quality of the biosphere, which, if implemented, would set in 
motion the kind of social change needed to lead us out of the viscious spirals 
of increasing population, pollution, poverty, energy demands, etc. The stra­
tegic importance of neuroscience and the central role of prevailing concepts 
of the mind-brain relation to all of the foregoing remain evident throughout, 
as does also the direct relevance of efforts to bring added insight and 
substantiation of these mind-brain concepts through further advances in 
brain research. 
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